UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-8-2016

Arnold v. City of Stanley Respondent's Brief Dckt.
43868

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Arnold v. City of Stanley Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43868" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6333.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6333

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

JJn tbt ~uprtmt Qtourt of tbt ~tatt of JJbabo
Supreme Court Case No. 43868-2015

THOMAS ARNOLD and REBECCA ARNOLD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
vs.
CITY OF STANLEY, a political subdivision in the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Custer County
Case No. CV 2014-35
Hon. Alan C. Stephens, presiding

Attorney for Defendant - Respondent on Appeal:
Paul J. Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MSBT LAW, CHTD.
950 West Bannock Street, Suite #520
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff- Appellant:
Thomas J. Lloyd, III
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
0BERRECHT, P.A.
950 W Bannock St, Ste 950
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600 Ext.
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: tlloyd@greenerlaw.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 1

II.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ................................................................................... 5

III.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................. 5
A. Is Judicial Review available for the denial of a building permit? ........................... 5

IV.

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 8
A. Public Health and Safety: Bereft of any explanation other than the access was to
be "graveled", the District Court correctly determined that the City correctly
could not render a finding that Arnold complied with the Stanley Municipal
Code............................................................................................................................... 8

1. "Graveled" fails to demonstrate sound engineering practices . ................................ 8
2. Arnold contends that the City's subdivision ordinance governing development on
a hillside does not apply to a lot within a subdivision for proposed development
on a hillside ............................................................................................................ 10
B. As a property owner, the City cannot be compelled to grant Arnold a second
access to its right of way from a lot in a duly approved subdivision ..................... 17
1. An adjacent lot's vested right appurtenant to the land extended to every

subsequent subdivision lot? ................................................................................... 17
2. The contractual context: the City cannot be compelled to issue a second access
to a lot duly created and approved but in contradiction with the Mountain View
Subdivision Plat. .................................................................................................... 20
3. Lot 5 is not limited to a single access point. ......................................................... .22
C. An amendment of the subdivision plat is needed to construct an access road on a
slope exceeding ten percent in contravention of the Subdivision Plat.................. 23
D. Additional ancillary arguments presented in the Arnold's Brief.......................... 25

1. On a Commercial Lot within a duly established subdivision, the distinction
between an Access Road versus Driveway is irrelevant.. ...................................... 25

2. Arnold's contention that a plat is not required to identify points of connectivity
from the internal subdivision to the outside adjacent public rights of way is
irrelevant but nonetheless incorrect. ...................................................................... 28
3. Arnold's contention that the access drive is not constructed on City property is
erroneous ................................................................................................................ 29
4. Arnold's equal protection argument lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law........ .31
E. Arnold has failed to demonstrate that the City prejudiced her substantial rights
or that she has suffered any harm ............................................................................ 33
1. Arnold's purported Vested Right Appurtenant to the Land ................................. .33

2. Arnold has failed to demonstrate prejudice by virtue of a purported lack of a
transcribable record ................................................................................................ 35
V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ................................................................................. 36

VI.

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 38

11

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Akers v. Mortensen, 14 7 Idaho 39, 205 P .3d 117 5 (2009) ........................................................... 17
Arnoldv. City ofStanley, 158 Idaho 218,345 P.3d 1008 (2015) ........................................... 37, 38
Austin v. Austin, 350 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla.Ct.App.1977) .............................................................. 16
Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City ofIdaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595,448 P.2d 209 (1968) ................. 10, 26, 27
Black Labrador Investing LLC, v. Kuna, 147 Idaho 92, 205 P .3d 1228 (2009) ............................. 8
Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d 419 (2005) ........................................................ 37
Cf Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941) ............................................. 30
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115,867 P.2d 989 (1994) ................ 35
City ofNampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho 530,547 P.2d 1135 (1976) .................................................. 30
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994) ...... 7
Coeur D'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006) ................................................ 32
Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,286 P. 353 (1930) ........................... 20, 27
Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980) ....................................................... 35
Cunningham v. City of Twin Falls, 125 Idaho 776, 874 P.2d 587 (App. 1994) ..................... 10, 27
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) ............................................................ 34
Farris v. City ofTwin Falls, 81 Idaho 583,347 P.2d 996 (1959) ................................................ 20
Gay v. County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.1982) .... 35
Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P.3d 900 (2008) ........ 6, 7, 27
Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002) .................................................. 29
Johnson v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44,390 P.2d 291 (1964) .......................................... 17, 18, 19, 27
Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591,599 (2000) .............. 16
Keyserv. CityofBoise,30Idaho440, 165P.1121 (1917) .......................................................... 30
Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501, 716 P.2d 1273 (1986) ................................... 29, 31
Local 1494 ofthe Int'! Ass'n ofFirefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,
586 P.2d 1346 (1978) .................................................................................................................. 6
Lochsa Falls, LLC v. !TD, 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d 963 (2009) ..................................... 20, 21, 22
Merritt v. State, 742 P.2d 397, 113 Idaho 142 (1986) ............................................................ 20, 30
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126 (2007) .................................. 33
Raina/div. Public Emp. Retirement Bd., 115 N.M. 650, 857 P.2d 761, 769 (1993) .................... 16
Ravenscroft v. Boise County, 154 Idaho 613, 301P.3d 271 (2013) ................................................ 5
Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999) ... 36
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 356 P.3d 377 (2015) ................... 7
South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs, 117 Idaho 857, 792 P .2d 882 (1990) ...................... 10
Stafford v. Kootenai County, 150 Idaho 841,252 P.3d 1259 (2011) .............................................. 6
Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. ofCom'rs., 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) .......................... 34
Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 115 Idaho 214,254 P.3d 1210 (2011) ..................................... 7
Tyrolean Associates v. City of Ketchum, 100 Idaho 703,604 P.2d 717 (1979) ........................... 30
Village ofSandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908) ............................................. 19, 27

Wylie v. ITD and City of Meridian, 151 Idaho 26, 253 P .3d 700 (2011) ..................................... 21
Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d 681 (1948) ................... 30
Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 25 P.3d 117 (2001) ...................... 32
Statutes
Idaho Code§ 12-117 ............................................................................................... 5, 21, 36, 37, 38
Idaho Code§ 50-1304 ................................................................................................................... 28
Idaho Code§ 50-1313 ................................................................................................................... 28
Idaho Code§ 50-1330 ................................................................................................................... 28
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) .............................................................................................................. 33
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4) .............................................................................................................. 33
Idaho Code§ 67-6517 ................................................................................................................. 6, 7
Idaho Code§ 67-6519 ..................................................................................................................... 8
Idaho Code § 67-6521 ..................................................................................................................... 6
Idaho Code § 67-6523 ..................................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code § 67 -6524 ..................................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code§ 67-6535 ..................................................................................................................... 7
Idaho Code§ 67-6536 ............................................................................................................... 7, 35
Stanley Municipal Code 15.04 ........................................................................................................ 8
Stanley Municipal Code 15.04.010 ....................................................................................... 1, 8, 39
Stanley Municipal Code 15.04.020 ....................................................................................... 1, 9, 39
Stanley Municipal Code 15.04.040(c) ............................................................................................ 8
Stanley Municipal Code 16.08 ........................................................................................................ 1
Stanley Municipal Code 16.08.180 ................................................................................................. 1
Stanley MunicipaJ Code 16.16.030 ............................................................................................... 29
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.010 ............................................................................................... 10
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.020 ........................................................................................... 2, 12
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.030 ............................................................................................... 13
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.040 ............................................................................................... 11
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.050 ............................................................................................... 12
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.060 ............................................................................................... 13
Stanley Municipal Code 16.36.070 ..................................................................................... 2, 10, 12
Stanley Municipal Code 17.24 ...................................................................................................... 25
Stanley Municipal Code l 7.24.010 ........................................................................................... 4, 25
Stanley Municipal Code 17.40.032 ....................................................................... 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 14
Stanley Municipal Code l 7.44.050 ................................................................................................. 2
Stanley Municipal Code 6.16.030 ................................................................................................. 28
Other Authorities
lOA McQuillin, §30:62 (3d ed. 1990) .......................................................................................... 25
Black's Law Dictionary 1440 (9th ed. 2009) ................................................................................. 26
Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2 ................................................................................................................ 8

IV

McQuillen, §30.40 ........................................................................................................................ 29
McQuillen, §30.63 ........................................................................................................................ 19

Rules
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 ........................................................................................................... 5, 36
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ........................................................................................................... 5, 36

V

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The District Court correctly ruled that Rebecca Arnold ("Arnold") is not entitled to a
building permit. In support of her building permit application seeking to develop an access road
down a steep slope of approximately fifteen percent, 1 she failed to provide a scintilla of
information that would enable the City to evaluate and render educated findings that the
proposed access road was constructed safely utilizing sound engineering practices. 2

In

contravention of SMC 15.04.020, Arnold believes it is sufficient to merely state that the access
road will be "graveled" and that "gravel to be placed as needed to provide access to/from the
property to/from Ace of Diamonds by all types ofvehicles". 3 As a matter of public safety, this
explanation wholly fails to comply with the plethora of Stanley Municipal Code provisions
governing development on a slope exceeding ten percent. i
1 See

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, A.R. p. 34.
"The subdivision is partially impacted by a FEMA "A" flood zone. The subdivision is
characterized by slopes that may exceed 15 per cent [sic] and this particular slope from Ace of
Diamonds is quite steep in nature although the Applicant has not provided this information.
Subdivisions that contain any portion having an average slope of 10% or more are subject to the
Hillside requirements of the Stanley Municipal Code 16.08. Lots that exceed 15% slope are
subject to the Hillside provisions of Stanley Municipal Code 17.40.

See also A.R. 56 showing the contour lines. See also SMC 16.08.180 defines a "Hillside subdivision" as "any
subdivision, or portion thereof, having an average slope of ten percent (10%) or more." (Ord. 52, 1978) See also
zoning requirement ordinance SMC 17.40.032 governing hillside development.
2 The Stanley Municipal Code unequivocally requires that a "Permittee shall follow good engineering practices
relating to fill compaction for structural support and for preventing collapse and/or erosion of fill not used for
structural support." SMC 15.04.010. The application additionally must include "[d]evelopment and construction
drawings and technical support material . . . in sufficient detail to allow a technical or engineering review to
determine whether the proposed development complies with all zoning requirements". SMC 15.04.020.

In short, the City does not have any way of knowing what she did out there, what material she utilized, whether it
can withstand ·vehicular traffic, Stanley's weather, or accommodate Spring runoff, or any other of the myriad of
reasons why the State, municipalities, highway districts, and counties all have the power to regulate the construction
ofroads within their jurisdiction.
3
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Had Arnold indicated on her preliminary plat application that she wished to develop this
eastern edge of Lot 5 as an access road, there is no question that numerous Stanley Municipal
Code provisions governing such hillside development would have governed such construction4
including but not iirnited to the necessity to provide a hillside deveiopment evaluation,
engineering plans, a grading plan, a maintenance plan, comply with further development
standards, and a vegetation and revegetation plan. 5
Rather, Arnold merely proffered the conclusory legal maxim that a lot owner in a duly
approved subdivision abutting a city street possesses a constitutional right appurtenant to the
land to access that street (with the incidental right to place great quantities of fill material on the
City's right of way) regardless that such an access is not depicted or requested in her preliminary
and final plat; that the City is powerless to regulate her access to Ace of Diamonds Street.
Arnold has not offered a single case to support her conclusion that somehow she has successfully
evaded the City's hillside ordinances by waiting to the building permit stage to unveil her desire
to develop the hillside.

The City's hillside ordinances, which predate the Mountain View

Subdivision Plat, are unequivocal and clearly apply to a subdivision access road on a slope
exceeding ten percent.
The District Court correctly noted that there is a legal process to approve access roads
within an approved subdivision allowing adjacent property owners and the City as a property
owner to make an educated decision whether to accept or deny a subdivision plan with access

Se A.R. 50, 63 "Building on a slope" referencing SMC 17.44.050, 17.40.032, and the entirety ofSMS 16.36
(16.36.020, 16.36.030, 16.36.040, 16.36.060, and 16.36.060).
5 SMC 16.36.020 through SMC 16.36.070.

4
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roads to wit: the subdivision platting or re-platting process. Arnold is the owner and developer
of the Mountain View Subdivision which received final plat approval on April 11, 2007. As
unequivocally depicted on the approved plat for the Mountain View Subdivision, Lot 5 was
granted direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along
the western edge of Lot 6. 6 This is further reiterated in numerous prior building permit approvals
(BP # 690, 690R-l 7, 744, 789 etc.) wherein access and utilities are clearly depicted along this
western edge. Arnold herself stated in the following in Permit 690R-2:
No structure; excavation, grading and fill material, construction of Mountain
View Subdivision Utilities (underground); silt fencing and/or retaining walls ... ;
construction of access roads; utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat
approval for Mountain View Subdivision.
Emphasis added. Now, in building permit application #831, 8 Arnold diverges from these prior
approvals by seeking to access the eastern edge of Lot 5 from the west end of Ace of Diamonds
street. This is not depicted on the approved Mountain View Plat and an application to amend the
plat has not been submitted. Further Arnold proposed and then illegally placed great quantities
of fill of an unknown substance on the City's right ofway. 9
This access road is clearly not depicted on her plat nor is there any evidence in the record
to support the City's approval of an access from Ace of Diamonds to Lot 5. Arnold has not

AR. P. 65.
See A.R. p. 32-33, f.n. 1-3; Permit 690 was approved on November 8, 2006 and renewed as 690R-1 on November
14, 2007, again as 690R-2 on or about May 11, 2010 and again as Building Permit 789 and yet again as 789-R2 on
May 14, 2013. Building Permit 789-R2 was valid through May 12, 2014. Building Permit 831, the subject of this
action, was submitted and purportedly reiterated the already issued and still valid Building Permit 789. Id
8 A.R. p. 69-70.
9 See A.R. 52. In particular, See the arrows in relation to the fence line. The fence line shows the preexisting level
and the arrows shows the sheer amount of fill placed on the city right ofway.

6
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amended her plat nor indicated that her approved access is unsatisfactory. More importantly, she
was granted the only access that she specifically asked for in her plat.
This does not mean that two accesses are forever legally precluded as Arnold perceives,
but there is a process to be followed when such material changes are presented. Now, before the
District Court and this Court for the first time, she wishes to change her chosen label of "access
road" and call her access a "driveway" in order to justify her subterfuge as to why her access
road is not depicted on her plat. While we disagree, this side-steps the pertinent issue. If Arnold
had been forthright in stating that she intended to develop this hillside as an access road off of
Ace of Diamonds street to Lot 5, the hillside ordinances clearly would apply and the City,
adjacent property owners, and the citizenry all would have the due process right to weigh in as to
whether 1) this could be accomplished safely per the Stanley Municipal Code; and 2) whether
the access road on the other side of her lot connecting Lot 5 to Highway 21 through Lot 6 is
needed or appropriate.
As to this second point, the City or a citizen's review of the preliminary plat shows the
Highway. 21 access road ending in a cul-de-sac/ dead-end. By adding an access on the eastern
edge to Ace of Diamonds coupled with the west access to Highway 21, this commercial lot now
potentially creates connectivity between the two roads.

Depending on the nature of the

commercial business (of which the table of permitted uses in this commercial zone is extensive;
See 17.24.010), this fundamentally and materially changes the nature of the subdivision and to
the City's downtown. Where the building permit process is mostly ministerial and does not
require a public hearing, the platting process affords due process via a public hearing. This is

-4-

specifically what Arnold demands; the City to ministerially issue her a building permit without
compliance with the hillside ordinances and without transparency to the City or the public as to
her construction methods. The District Court correctly noted that if an additional access can be
built as a matter of right in contradiction to the approved plat and that a city council is powerless
to refuse to issue a building permit for such an access, this essentially renders the plat approval
process as arbitrary.

II.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The City seeks attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this action on appeal in
accordance with Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 for the reason that
Arnold brought this cause of action without a reasonable basis in fact or law nor reasonable
extension thereof.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Is Judicial Review available for the denial of a building permit?
The first threshold issue in this case is whether this Court even has jurisdiction. "The

IAP A and its judicial review provisions do not apply to the actions of local governing bodies,
unless expressly authorized by statute." 10

"To obtain judicial review of final action under

LLUP A, there must be a statute granting the right of judicial review. Arnold cites to two cases
from 2008 wherein this Court in dictum purportedly asserted that judicial review is afforded to
the denial of a building permit. This is irrelevant since the statutes were amended in 2010

10

Ravenscroftv. Boise County, 154 Idaho 613, 301P.3d 271 (2013).
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wherein the legislature limited the persons entitled to judicial review under LLUP A."ll Pre-2010
the Legislature afforded judicial review to those "affected by the issuance or denial of a permit
authorizing development" or by those denied a permit or "aggrieved by the decision for the
application for the permit". 12 Post-2010 LLUPA's plain text is now devoid of any reference to a
"permit". Moreover, a building permit is not included in the enumerated list of applications that
are entitled to judicial review. "Idaho has recognized the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius[;J where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things

excludes all others."

13

A building permit is not "an application for a subdivision, variance,

special use permit [or] . . . such other applications required or authorized pursuant to this
chapter." 14
Arnold latches onto "other applications ... authorized pursuant to this chapter". Yet, only
a narrow class of building permits are authorized pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-6517 "for
development on any lands designated upon the future acquisitions map." 15 This Court cautioned
about this consequence in a 2008 dissenting opinion in Highlands Development Corp.:
If one reads LC. § 67-6519(2) to establish the entire universe of decisions that
may be appealed under LLUP A-"a permit required or authorized under this
chapter" -we would eliminate appeals for decisions granting or denying most
building permits, as LC. § 67-6517 only deals with building permits "for
11 Stafford v. Kootenai County, 150 Idaho 841, 847, 252 P.3d 1259, 1265 (201 l)(intemal citations omitted). While
there is no case regarding judicial review of a building permit, in prior dictum, there is support for the conclusion
that the prior pre-2010 Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) would likely provide jurisdiction to any applicant "aggrieved by a
decision", which could include a building permit. Regardless, this language no longer appears in the statute.
12 Highlands Development Corp. v. City ofBoise, 145 Idaho 958,961, 188 P.3d 900,903 (2008).
13 Id citing Local 1494 of the Int'/ Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346,
1355 (1978).
14 Idaho Code§ 67-6521 (Emphasis added).
15 Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 964-965, 188 P.3d 900, 906-907 (2008). 145 Idaho
at 964-65, 188 P.3d at 906-07 (Justice Jim Jones dissenting).
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development on any lands designated upon the future acquisitions map," but not
with the great number of building permits based upon existing land use
ordinances. Review would be precluded for all zoning decisions, as well as
interim and emergency moratoria on issuance of selected classes of permits under
I.C. §§ 67-6523 and 6524 because moratoria are not stated to be permits. 16
The Legisiature saw fit to remove any reference to a "permit" in the 20 i O amendment thus
exercising its discretion in opening the door to the various zoning decisions and other LLUPA
applications that are not technically "permits". Concomitantly the Legislature further distanced
any non-LC. § 67-6517 building permit from entitlement to judicial review. We must assume
this was intentional. 17
As a practical matter this makes sense when construing the statutes together. 18
Typically, the conventional medium for compelling the issuance of a building permit is through a

writ of mandate. Conversely, an application required or authorized under LLUPA requires a
transcribable record (Idaho Code § 67-6536) and findings of fact, conclusions of law (Idaho
Code § 67-6535); both of which can only occur during a public meeting presided over and
thereafter authored by the elected governing body. Yet, the issuance or denial of a building
permit does not occur at a public meeting. Generally ministerial in nature, building permits are
typically issued at the staff level by the building inspector or planning and zoning administrator;

16

Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 964-965, 188 P.3d 900, 906-907 (2008).
Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 115 Idaho 214,218,254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011) "Courts must construe statutes
" under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the
statute was passed." Id citing City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150,879 P.2d
1078, 1083 (1994).
18 The Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 356 P.3d 377, 379-380 (2015).
17
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none

which is subject to

requirements governing transcribable records or findings

of fact, conclusions of law.
That the City did so in this instance merely reflects the City's anticipation of Arnold's
litigious nature. The City was not required to do so. 19 Reading the statutes together, this Court is
in essence being asked to determine that the Legislature intended that every building permit
issued in this State can only be issued following a public hearing (hence a transcribable record
which can only occur in a public meeting) followed by written findings of fact, conclusions of
law. Clearly if the legislature had intended such a requirement, the plain text of the statutes
would depict as such. Arnold is not entitled to judicial review.
IV.
ARGUMENT

A.

Public Health and Safety: Bereft of any explanation other than the access was to be
"graveled", the District Court correctly determined that the City correctly could not
render a finding that Arnold complied with the Stanley Municipal Code.

1.

"Graveled" fails to demonstrate sound engineering practices.

SMC 15.04 governs the process for the issuance of a building permit. SMC 15.04.010
provides that

19 Arnold believes that this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of SMC I5.04.040(c) which essentially mirrors the pre2010 LC.§ 67-6519 text allowing an applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision to seek judicial review
"under the procedures provided by Idaho Code and any amendments thereto." As clearly articulated in Black
Labrador Investing LLC, v. Kuna, 147 Idaho 92, 205 P.3d 1228 (2009) and numerous other decisions, a city
ordinance cannot authorize judicial review. The power to enact such a law was outside the scope of local police
regulations delegated to counties under Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2. To the extent the City's law may be interpreted as
purporting to authorize judicial review differently than the statute, it is conflict with the general laws of the State and
invalid.

-8-

No ... lot [shall] be excavated for sidewalks, ... roads, or any other purpose, nor
shall fill be placed on any lot, nor shall any lot be cleared, or fenced unless a
building permit therefor has been issued... Permittee shall follow good
engineering practices relating to fill compaction for structural support and for
preventing collapse and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support.
Emphasis added. SMC 15.04.020 additionally requires that
Applications ... shall be accompanied [with] ... a drawing showing the location
of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the location of the
property in the city, building plans and specifications, and proof of approval of
the proposed project by the appropriate fire department and the appropriate sewer
district or state health department. Applications which do not contain all of the
foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and construction
drawings and technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient
detail to allow a technical or engineering review to determine whether the
proposed development complies with all zoning20 requirements.
Emphasis added.
What technical information has she provided that would lead a responsible decision
maker to conduct an engineering review such to render a finding that she has demonstrated
"good engineering practices" thereby protecting the public health and safety?

In

her

application she merely provided that Ace of Diamonds Street was to be "graveled" and that
"gravel to be placed as needed to provide access to/from the property to/from Ace of Diamonds
by all types of vehicles". 21 There is a complete absence of the information required pursuant to
SMC 16.36 and 17.40.032. In fact, there is a complete absence of any explanation of the
engineering employed.

20 Arnold continually asserts there are no such zoning requirements.
In addition to being subject to the City's
hillside provisions of 16.36 (which predated the Mountain View Subdivision) see also SMC 17.40.032: HILLSIDE
PROVISIONS which regulates cut and fill slope construction activities, revegetation planning, and reqµirements for
public safety, erosion, and other aesthetic considerations.
21 A.R. p. 69-70.

-9-

The City is not the applicant. The City is not the engineer. The onus is on the applicant
to demonstrate good engineering practices. ~t is not the City's job to stand in the shoes of an
engineer/applicant to produce development and construction drawings and technical support
material. It is the City's job after such information is provided to conduct its own engineering
review of the applicant's plans to verify that good engineering practices have been followed so

that this access road does not collapse or erode and suffer other concerns related to the public
health and safety.
2.

Arnold contends that the City's subdivision ordinance governing development on
a hillside does not apply to a lot within a subdivision for proposed development
on a hillside.

Arnold proverbially wants to have her cake and eat it too. Whether in 2007 when the
Mountain View Subdivision was considered or today, whether clothed as a plat, re-plat or
building permit in a lot in a duly approved subdivision, if an applicant submits an application to
develop on a hillside such as building a subdivision access road on a steep ravine such as seen on
the eastern edge of lot 5, SMC 16.3622 and SMC 17.40.032 governing hillside development
clearly would apply. "[A]n applicant's rights are determined by the ordinance in existence at the
time of filing an application for the permit." 23 This "South Fork Coalition rule is applicable
where a building permit has been applied for prior to the amendment or change in the
ordinance. " 24

See SMC 16.36.010 through 16.36.070.
South Fork Coalition v. Board ofComm'rs, 117 Idaho 857,861, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (1990); Ben Lomond, Inc. v.
City ofIdaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595,448 P.2d 209 (1968) ("Lomond").
24 Cunningham v. City ofTwin Falls, 125 Idaho 776,781,874 P.2d 587,592 (App. 1994).

22
23
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The City's hillside ordinances, SMC 16.36 and 17.40 .032, predate the Mountain View
Subdivision plat. A portion of the Mountain View Subdivision includes a slope likely in excess
of fifteen percent; i.e. from this eastern edge of Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds. 25 Therefore, the
Mountain View Subdivision is subject to the Stanley Municipal Code hillside ordinances, zoning
ordinances, and every other ordinance in effect at the time of application. Further, Lot 5 is a lot
in a subdivision governed by the hillside ordinances
. Whether by subterfuge or accident, the Mountain View Subdivision plat clearly depicts
that Lot 5 was granted direct access from Highway 21, and conversely it does not depict that
Arnold intended to build an access road from Ace of Diamonds down a steep ravine along this
eastern edge of Lot 5. This begets the question as to what a subdivision applicant is required to
demonstrate to obtain subdivision approval. It would be illogical, arguably punitive, to require
an applicant to provide, for example, a grading plan for an access road no one knew was to be
built,26 a revegetation plan of a hillside no one knew would be used as an access, 27 a maintenance

25

26

See Findings, A.R. 34 and contour lines of this slope A.R. p. 56
16.36.040: GRADING PLAN:
A. A preliminary grading plan shall be submitted with each hillside preliminary plat proposal and shall include
the following information:
·
1. Approximate limiting dimensions, elevations, or finish contours to be achieved by the grading, including
all cut and fill slopes, proposed drainage channels and related construction;
2. Preliminary plans and approximate locations of all surface and subsurface drainage devices, walls, dams,
sediment basins, storage reservoirs and other protective devices to be constructed;
3. A description of methods to be employed in disposing of soil and other material that is removed from the
grading site, including the location of the disposal site.
B. A final grading plan shall be submitted with each final plat and shall include the following information:
1. Limiting dimensions, elevations or finish contours to be achieved by the grading, including all proposed
cut and fill slopes, and proposed drainage channels and related construction;
2. Detailed plans and locations of all surface and subsurface drainage devices, walls, dams, sediment
basins, storage reservoirs and other protective devices to be constructed;
3. A schedule showing when each stage of the project will be completed, including the total area of soil
surface which is to be disturbed during each stage together with estimated starting and completion dates. In
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plan showing who and how someone is going to maintain this non-existent access into a
commercial establishment28 , a hillside development evaluation (see below)29 , engineering plans

no event shall the existing ("natural") vegetative ground cover be destroyed, removed, or disturbed more
than fifteen ( 15) days prior of grading. ( Ord. 52, 1978)
27 16.36.070: VEGETATION AND REVEGETATION:
A. The developer shall submit a slope stabilization and revegetation plan which shall include a complete
description of the existing vegetation, the vegetation to be removed and the method of disposal, the vegetation
to be planted, and slope stabilization measures to be installed. The plan shall include an analysis of the
environmental effects of such operations, including the effects on slope stability, soil erosion, water quality, and
fish and wildlife.
B. Vegetation sufficient to stabilize the soil shall be established on all disturbed areas as each stage of grading is
completed. Areas not contained within lot boundaries shall be protected with perennial vegetal cover after all
construction is completed. Efforts shall be made to plant those species that tend to recover from fire damage and
do not contribute to a rapid rate of fire spread.
C. The developer shall be fully responsible for any destruction of native vegetation proposed for retention. He
shall carry the responsibility both for his own employees and for all subcontractors from the first day of
construction until the notice of completion is filed. The developer shall be responsible for replacing such
destroyed vegetation. (Ord. 52, 1978)
28 16.36.050: MAINTENANCE:
The owner of any private property on which grading or other work has been performed pursuant to a grading
plan approved or a building permit granted under the provisions of this title shall continuously maintain and
repair all graded surfaces and erosion prevention devices, retaining walls, drainage structures or means, and
other protective devices, plantings and ground cover installed or completed. (Ord. 52, 1978)
29 16.36.020: HILLSIDE DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION:
A. All development proposals shall take into account and shall be judged by the way in which land use
planning, soil mechanics, engineering geology, hydrology, civil engineering, environmental and civic design,
architectural and landscape design are applied in hillside areas, including, but not limited to:
1. Planning of development to fit the topography soils, geology, hydrology, and other conditions existing
on the proposed site;
2. Orientation of development on the site so that grading and other site preparation is kept to an absolute
minimum;
3. Shaping of essential grading to blend with natural landforms and to minimize the necessity of padding
and/or terracing of building sites;
4. Division of large tracts into smaller workable units on which construction can be completed within one
construction season so that large areas are not left bare and exposed during the winter-spring runoff period;
5. Completion of paving as rapidly as possible after grading;
6. Allocation of areas not well suited for development because of soil, geology, or hydrology limitations for
open space and recreation uses;
7. Minimizing disruption of existing plant and animal life;
8. Consideration of the view from and of the hills.
B. Areas having soil, geology, or hydrology hazards shall not be developed unless it is shown that their
limitations can be overcome; that hazard to life or property will not exist; that the safety, use or stability of a
public way or drainage channel is not jeopardized; and that the natural environment is not subjected to undue
impact. (Ord. 52, 1978)
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including a soils report, geology report, and hydrology report for an unknown access;30 and
further development standards such as fill composition and compaction and road construction
standards for an access road. 31 Rather it is the development of the hillside, or an expressed
intention to do so that would trigger the need to satisfy these requirements. 32

30

31

16.36.030: ENGINEERING PLANS:
The developers shall retain a professional engineer(s) to obtain the following information:
A. Soils Report: For any proposed hillside development, a soils engineering report shall be submitted with the
preliminary plat. This report shall include data regarding the nature, distribution and strength of existing soils,
conclusions and recommendations for grading procedures, design criteria for corrective measures, and opinions
and recommendations covering the adequacy of sites to be developed.
B. Geology Report:
1. For any proposed hillside development a geology report shall be submitted with the preliminary plat.
This report shall include an adequate description of site geology and an evaluation of the relationship
between the proposed development and the underlying geology and recommendations for remedial
remedies.
2. The investigation and subsequent report shall be completed by a professional hydrologist registered in
the state of Idaho.
C. Hydrology Report:
1. For any proposed hillside development a hydrology report shall be submitted with the preliminary plat.
This report shall include an adequate description of the hydrology, conclusions and recommendations
regarding the effect of hydrologic conditions on the proposed development, and opinions and
recommendations covering the adequacy of sites to be developed. (Ord. 52, 1978)
16.36.060: DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS:
A. Soils:
1. Fill areas shall be prepared by removing organic material, such as vegetation and rubbish, and any other
material which is determined by the soils engineer to be detrimental to proper compaction or otherwise not
conducive to stability; no rock or similar irreducible material with a maximum dimension greater than eight
inches (8 11 ) shall be used as fill material in fills that are intended to provide structural strength.
2. Fills shall be compacted to at least ninety five percent (95%) of maximum density, as determined by
AASHO T99 and ASTM D698.
3. Cut slopes shall be no steeper than two (2) horizontal to one vertical; subsurface drainage shall be
provided as necessary for stability.
4. Fill slopes shall be no steeper than two (2) horizontal to one vertical; fill slopes shall not be located on
natural slopes two to one (2: 1) or steeper, or where fill slope toes out within twelve feet (12') horizontally
of the top ofan existing or planned cut slope.
5. Tops and toes of cut and fill slopes shall be set back from property boundaries a distance of three feet (3 ')
plus one-fifth ( 1/s) of the height of the cut or fill, but need not exceed a horizontal distance often feet (10');
tops and toes of cut and fill slopes shall be set back from structures a distance of six feet (6') plus one-fifth
(1/s) the height of the cut or fill, but need not exceed ten feet (10').
6. The maximum horizontal distance of disturbed soil surface shall not exceed seventy five feet (75').
B. Roadways:
1. Road alignments should follow the natural terrain and no unnecessary cuts or fills shall be allowed in
order to create additional lots or building sites.
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Ironically, Arnold does not dispute the applicability of these provisions to the
development of a subdivision access road on a slope exceeding ten percent. On page 37 of
Appellant's Opening Brief, she appears to acknowledge that "hillside stabilization, drainage, fill
material and proposed compaction, slope of fill, retaining walls" etc. 33 are all viable legal
standards and would apply to an access road from this eastern edge of Lot 5 to Ace of Diamonds
at the subdivision stage. Incredulously, without a single case in support of her claim, she deems
them inapplicable to her subdivision lot at the building permit stage stating that somehow these
standards are not applicable to a building permit for a driveway, but are for the
approval of a subdivision deemed a "Hillside Development" under Title 16 of the
City Code ... The Mountain View Subdivision had already been approved and was
not classified as a "Hillside Development". . . [and thus] the alleged "standards"
relied upon by the City have no relation to building permit applications under
Title 15 ... "
Arnold's subdivision application (and every corresponding lot created by virtue thereof)
is subject to all ordinances in effect at time of application. There is no pre-requisite to attach the
2. One-way streets shall be permitted and encouraged where appropriate for the terrain and where public
safety would not be jeopardized. Maximum width shall be seventeen feet (17') between the backs of curbs.
3. The width of the graded section shall extend three feet (3') beyond the curb back or edge of pavement on
both the cut and fill sides of the roadway. If sidewalk is to be installed parallel to the roadway, the graded
section shall be increased by the width of the sidewalk plus one foot ( l ') beyond the curb back.
4. Standard vertical curb (6 inches) and gutter shall be installed along both sides of all paved roadways.
5. A pedestrian walkway plan may be required.
C. Driveways And Parking: Combinations of collective private driveways, cluster parking areas and on street
parallel parking bays shall be used to attempt to optimize the objectives of minimum soil disturbance, minimum
impervious cover, excellence of design and aesthetic sensitivity. (Ord. 84, 5-8-1990: Ord. 52, 1978).
32 This is an important point as the subject slope is on the very eastern edge of Lot 5 presumably outside of any
setback building envelop. The zoning ordinance, SMC 17.40.032, is not technically triggered unless the "building
site where the topographic slope of said building site exceeds fifteen percent (15%) grade". Unless and until the
applicant indicates that they wish to include this eastern edge as part of a building site, the ordinance is arguably not
triggered. It is only in building permit #831 that the City first learned that Arnold wished to develop this eastern
edge slope as an access road.
33 As codified in SMC 16.36; See the Findings ofFact, Conclusions oflaw.
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entire code or to otherwise "deem" or "classify" the application subject to the Stanley Municipal
Code to deem them applicable.

Yet, Arnold believes that in gaining subdivision approval

depicting only an access road through Lot 6, she can successfully evade the application of the
hillside ordinances by withholding her intent to develop the hillside until her ninth renewal of her
various building permits. What is legally unsupportable is her claim that the hillside ordinances
somehow are deemed waived or precluded by estoppel when a subsequent request, whether by
re-plat or building permit, reveals an intent to develop the hillside.
Read together, Arnold's arguments are illogical. She concedes that an "access drive"
developed on a slope exceeding ten percent requires compliance with the hillside ordinance if it
is addressed during the subdivision approval stage. Yet, she claims that a "driveway" does not
ever need to be depicted on a plat, but that it is a right appurtenant to the land to connect to an
abutting street. In short, the City can always require the construction of an access road to
comply since it must be disclosed at the subdivision stage, but the city evidently can never
require a driveway to comply with the hillside ordinance, which, according to her, is not required
to be depicted on the subdivision plat and only comes up at the building permit stage.
Arnold cannot have it both ways. In building permit #831 Arnold clearly depicted her
proposed development on this steep slope, but she did not depict such development in her plat in
2007 or any of her building permits leading up to #831. Yet, in arguing that a re-plat is not
required, she argues the development of this access on a steep slope was contemplated or at least
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implied in 2007 and thereafter in subsequent building permits. 34 If so, then all ordinances in
effect at the time of application apply; notably the hillside ordinances and Arnold is required to
comply. 35 Alternatively, if development on the hillside was not contemplated, adding a new
access road and altering a hillside is now a material change to the plat requiring a re-plat and the
hillside ordinances apply.
The alternative is ridiculous: either that upon initial application a grading plan, etc. is
required even in the absence of a manifested intent to develop the hillside; or that by withholding
an intent to develop the hillside in 2007 the hillside ordinances magically go away, in fact legally
precluded, and she can do absolutely anything with impunity. Ministerial in nature, the City
must simply accept whatever Arnold wishes to utilize to construct her access road to this
commercial lot whether it be dirt, gravel, or silly putty including modifying the City's right of
way. Respectfully, we do not agree; neither did the District Court.
The ordinances in effect at the time of application govern that application regardless of
whether by ignorance or subterfuge the players fail to apply them. There is no "gotcha" defense;
that Arnold can escape its provisions by sneaking it through estopping36 the City thereafter from

This is belied by her written statements; see for example, A.R. 92 wherein Arnold states: "The Hillside Ordinance
does not apply and even if applicable, none of the slopes exceed I 0% in the area where the road and utilities will be
installed." We agreed only insofar as the proposed development did not request building sites on slopes exceed ten
or fifteen percent. Well now they do exceed ten percent.
35 See also A.R. 73, where pursuant to a settlement agreement Arnold contractually agreed that "building permits ...
will be subject to the City ordinances in place at the time of application."
36 "The general rule is that administrative officers of the state cannot estop the state through mistaken statements of
law." Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138, 997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000) (citing Austin v. Austin,
350 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla.Ct.App.1977); Raina/div. Public Emp. Retirement Bd., 115 N.M. 650, 857 P.2d 761, 769
(1993))

34
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its enforcement. "[A] public body may not permit a use that is prohibited by ordinance."37 "A
city council or county commissioner may not permit an implied variance violative of land use
ordinances."38 Rather, as a matter of due process, an applicant may be relieved from complying
,vith municipal ordina..11ce requirements but only through a formal, noticed process such as a
variance, waiver, or like application. It can't be just ignored. Arnold's subdivision includes
portions on a steep slope and upon development the hillside ordinances apply. To argue the
alternative is at the expense of the public health and safety.

B.

As a property owner, the City cannot be compelled to grant Arnold a second access
to its right of way from a lot in a duly approved subdivision.
1.

An adjacent lot's vested right appurtenant to the land extended to every
subsequent subdivision lot?

Equally unpersuasive is Arnold's assertion that a city is compelled to grant a second
access to a lot within an approved subdivision by virtue that the lot is adjacent to a city street.
All of the cases cited by Arnold are clearly distinguishable. As a matter of law, a vested right
appurtenant to the land39 does not extend to a mere lot owner in a duly approved subdivision to

unsafely access an abutting public street where the lot is not landlocked and where an existing
duly approved access was clearly provided pursuant to the subdivision process by the applicant's
request. 40
Arnold largely relies upon Johnson v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51, 390 P.2d 291, 294
(1964) wherein the owner of two parcels (both of which enjoyed vehicular access to the city
37
38

Simpson, 142 Idaho at 839, 136 P.3d at 310.
Hubbard, 106 Idaho at 437, 680 P.2d at, 538.

39

Or implied easement by way of necessity.

40

Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 45-46, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009)( Akers II).
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street) sought to enJom the City of Boise from closing the curb cuts / driveways and
reconstructing the curb pursuant to its police powers to eliminate vehicular access from the street
to the property for public safety and parking considerations. 41

Arnold partially quotes this

Court's maxim that "access to a public way is one of the incidents of ovvnership of land
bounding thereon.

Such right is appurtenant to the land and is vested right." 42 The next

paragraph however provides that "this right of access, however, may be regulated, for it is
subservient to the primary rights of the public to the free use of the streets for travel and
incidental purposes."43
The substance of the Johnston opinion and the myriad of others that follow is this Court's
reiteration that a municipality's police power to police the streets and regulate the traffic thereon
outweighs incidental injury to an individual property owners' right to access the right of way. 44
If the exercise of authority "bears a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or

general welfare, such enactment would be valid within the inherent powers of the legislative
body". 45 As the Court noted:
This case presents the problem of reconciling the conflicting interests of the
public with that of the abutting owner. Under its exercise of the police power and
authority over the streets and in furtherance of the public good, the [city council]
for sufficient reason, can eliminate these curb cuts and the driveways without
incurring liability to the abutting owner for the resulting injury. 46

Johnson, 87 Idaho at 48, 390 P.2d at 33.
Id; 87 Idaho at 50-51.
43 Id.
44 Id; at 52.
45 Id
46 Id; at 51.

41

42
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As discussed in the previous section, a municipality clearly has the jurisdiction and power to
control whether an encroachment is permissible where, as here, the proposed access is down a
steep ravine jeopardizing the public health and safety. "Clearly, the rights of an owner of
property abutting the street or public way are subject to the power of the . . . municipality to
control and regulate the streets."47
The Court's analysis in Johnson and other precedent also focus on the existence or nonexistence of alternate or secondary accesses to an otherwise land-locked property;
As concerns the Bannock street premises, there exists access from the street to the
premises for pedestrian traffic not only from Bannock street and Eleventh street,
but also from the alley, vehicular traffic presently has access from Eleventh street
and potentially from the alley. 48
This Court's conclusion was dispositive: "Where the abutting owner had other means of access,
the right of access may be denied by a police regulation." 49 In short, the Johnson Court was
distinguishing the existence of secondary accesses in its fact pattern from that in prior precedent
including those cases cited by Arnold; 50 all of which are distinguishable from the present case.
First, none of these cases pertain to a mere lot within a duly approved subdivision.
Second, these cases unlike in Johnston and here, pertain to abutting property owners that were
completely deprived of access to any ingress / egress. The challenged municipal activity or
regulation completely "cut off' any access whatsoever to their property. Thus, in Village of
Sandpoint v. Doyle this Court noted:
McQuillen, §30.63.
Id; at 53.
49 Id
50 Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908), Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583,347
P.2d 996 (1959).
47
48
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. . . the village here constructed its bridge on the side of its right of way next to
[Doyle's] property and caused the bridge to adjoin the front of [Doyle's] lot. It
therefore cut him off from his previous right of access to the street on its natural
surface and left him without any means of egress and ingress at all, unless he can
go over the bridge." 51
In Farris v. City of Twin Falls, the City of Twin Falls negligently constructed a curb that raised
Washington Street eight inches above its previous location leaving the adjacent buildings eight
inches lower than the level of the street thereby wholly "cutting off' any access to the street. 52

2.

The contractual context: the City cannot be compelled to issue a second access
to a lot duly created and approved but in contradiction with the Mountain View
Subdivision Plat.

Lot 5 is not some homesteader's 640 acre section of farm land that is being deprived of
its historical access to a right of way. Lot 5 is,a creature of modern subdivision law and should
be viewed, in the words of Justice Jim Jones, in this "contractual context"53 • Pursuant to the
City's subdivision ordinances, Lot 5 is one of multiple lots in the duly approved Mountain View
Subdivision Plat and is subject to that Plat.

In Lochsa Falls, LLC v. ITD, a developer challenged ITD's requirement that the
developer install an internal collector street with a traffic signal in order to access Chinden
Boulevard. The developer wished to obtain the benefit of the bargain to subdivide 254 acres of
farm land into 740 residential lots and then, having received that benefit, cried foul that they had
to incur the cost of installing a collector street with a traffic signal. There is no mention of some
14 Idaho at 759-760. Emphasis added.
81 Idaho at 585. See also and Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353 (1930); a
takings action challenging an ordinance that completely prohibited drive-up gas stations within 500 feet of a school.
See also Merritt v. State, 742 P.2d 397, 113 Idaho 142 (1986).
53 Lochsa Falls, LLC v. !TD, 147 Idaho 232, 245, 207 P.3d 963, 976 (2009).

51

52
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divine vested property right appurtenant to the dozens, perhaps hundreds, of individual lot
owners that happen to abut Chinden Boulevard independent of and in contradiction to the plat
approval.

It was also irrelevant whether the individual lot owners labeled their access a

driveway, public road, drive access, road access, or game trail. The Lochsa Falls Court was
equally unsympathetic. This Court's concurring opinion articulated:
... This Justice was left with the abiding feeling that Lochsa Falls benefited much
more than the State from the Transaction at issue.... While Lochsa Falls portrays
itself as having been put upon by being required to signalize the intersection for
the benefit of the State and the motoring public, the reality is otherwise. The
salient facts are that Lochsa Falls wished to develop a parcel of property located
along a limited access highway, its traffic consultant recommended and it
requested a signalized intersection to provide subdivision access to and from the
highway, it was advised it could have the signalized intersection if it would pay
for the same, it raised no protest to this routine requirement, and having gotten the
benefit it sought Lochsa Falls now wishes to have ITD foot the bill.
This case could appropriately be analyzed in a contractual context Lochsa Falls
requests that ITD grant it the right to have a signalized intersection to benefit its
subdivision. ITD agrees, provided that Lochsa Falls pays for signalizing the
intersection. Lochsa Falls accepts the proposal without protest and proceeds to
perform the signalizing work. Upon completion of the work, Lochsa Falls
unilaterally changes its mind and decides it needs to be paid for the signalizing,
but expresses no intention of giving up the valuable benefit it has derived from the
deal. Lochsa Falls got what it bargained for but does not wish to honor its
undertaking to bear the cost of such benefit. Had Lochsa Falls objected to the
requirement that it pay for signalizing the intersection, it could simply have said
'thanks, but no thanks' and done without a signal. One suspects there is not the
slightest chance it would have done so, as the increase in the value of its lots
would substantially outweigh the cost of the traffic signal. .... Because Lochsa
Falls has brought and appealed claims without a reasonable basis in fact or law, I
would award ITD attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-117. 54
The bottom line was this: while the 254 acres of open farm land may have abutted a
public road (Chinden Blvd) and certainly would have a vested right to access the abutting road if

54

Id, at 245. See also Wylie v. !TD and City ofMeridian, 151 Idaho 26, 253 P.3d 700 (2011).
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it was otherwise rendered land-locked, this "vested right" does not survive the subdivision
process extending the right to each and every lot abutting the public road when a developer takes
advantage of Meridian's subdivision laws to subdivide this section of land into 740 residential
lots generating 12,480 trips per day.
Akin to Lochsa Falls, Arnold received the benefit of the bargain to subdivide a tract of
land taking full advantage of Stanley's subdivision ordinances. The resultant final plat of the
Mountain View Subdivision, prepared and presented by Arnold, clearly depicts that Lot 5 was
granted direct access from Highway 21 on its north-west side via an access road depicted along
the relatively flat western edge of Lot 6. 55 As she points out, this was her request. 56 She has
received the benefit of her bargain.

A local governmental jurisdiction is not compulsorily

required to extend a preexisting "vested right of access" to not only the original tract of land, but
to each and every resulting subdivision lot that happens to abut that public road.
3.

Lot 5 is not limited to a single access point.

The legal significance of an approved access pursuant to the Mountain View Subdivision
is not that Arnold is legally precluded from having two accesses or even that she is legally
precluded from adding a second access in contravention of an approved preliminary plat absent a

55

AR. P. 65.

56

Arnold clearly stated in Permit 690R-2:
No structure; excavation, grading and fill material, construction of Mountain View Subdivision
Utilities (underground); silt fencing and/or retaining walls ... ; construction of access roads;

utilities, etc. to be installed per preliminary plat approval for Mountain View Subdivision.
Emphasis added.
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plat amendment. Rather the legal significance of the Mountain View Subdivision plat is that
Arnold is not entitled to a second unsafe access as a matter of right shielded from the City's
hillside ordinances. Lot 5 is not land-locked nor has she in any way asserted that her approved,
bargained-for access pursuant to her preliminary plat is unworkable. If she vlishes to have a
second access, she must adhere to the City's subdivision ordinances that govern the construction
on such a steep ravine; ordinances that preexisted her preliminary plat application and apply to
any proposal to install an access road up this steep ravine to Ace of Diamonds street.
C.

An amendment of the subdivision plat is needed to construct an access road on a
slope exceeding ten percent in contravention of the Subdivision Plat.

As an ancillary issue, Arnold's argument regarding whether a building permit is the
proper medium in which to approve an access road is irrelevant for purposes of judicial review.
Nonetheless, the City contends that a building permit is not the proper medium in which to
address what is in all respects a material change to what is depicted on the duly approved plat.
Mentioned for the first time in litigation, Arnold now wishes to label her "access road" as an
"access drive" or "driveway" in order to justify the absence of the subject access on her
preliminary plat, but the label itself is irrelevant. Lot 5 is zoned commercial with a considerable
table of permitted uses. At present, Ace of Diamonds is a dead-end street. The western access
from Lot 5, through Lot 6 connecting to Highway 21 is a dead-end street. If Arnold is permitted
to add an eastern access into her commercial lot and if she chooses to continue to utilize her west
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access to Highway 21, 57 this in essence connects Ace of Diamonds street to Highway 21 through
this commercial lot; a dead-end, at least potentially, becomes connectivity. This fundamentally
changes the nature of the subdivision and downtown Stanley.
The City approved this subdivision, approved this commercial lot, and notably approved
the requested access from the western edge of Lot 5 through Lot 6 to Highway 21 without
knowledge that Arnold desired to develop an access from Ace of Diamonds. There has never
been a meeting of the minds on this issue. In addition to the safety considerations of building
such a steep access road given the City of Stanley's weather, this second access has potentially
further complications to vehicular traffic, pedestrian safety, snow removal, run-off, fire and
emergency access, erosion, drainage etc.
This does not mean that two accesses are legally precluded as Arnold alleges the City is
contending, but at the very least a process must allow for the citizenry to address this issue. A
mere building permit does not require a public hearing whereas a plat amendment allows the
City, neighbors, and the citizenry to testify as to whether two accesses into this commercial lot,
i.e. the western edge connection to highway 21 coupled with this eastern access to Ace of
Diamonds, may materially impact them. Regardless, to the extent that Arnold wishes to recreate
the wheel as to what was and was not specifically approved in her subdivision application, this is
not the venue or medium to challenge her subdivision plat entitlements.

Certainly, were the City to deny Lot 5 access to Highway 21, there is not the slightest chance that Arnold would
not be the first one to enforce the entitlements afforded to her pursuant to her plat approval.

57
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D.

Additional ancillary arguments presented in the Arnold's Brief.
1.

On a Commercial Lot within a duly established subdivision, the distinction
between an Access Road versus Driveway is irrelevant.

The City has looked through the record and Arnold consistently referred to her access as
an "access road" and not once as a "driveway". 58 Her reasons for doing so now are obvious.
For its part, although Arnold accuses the City as referring to her access road as a street or right of
way, the City has consistently referred to her proposal as an "access road" as it is an access to the
City's Right of Way; i.e .... an access to a road. 59
Whether called an access road, road easement, right of way, access drive, or, if she
prefers, an access driveway is inconsequential. What is consequential is that this lot is zoned
Commercial (SMC 17.24) with an expansive table of permitted uses (SMC 17.24.010); most of
which potentially include the ability of the general public to utilize this access to frequent the
commercial establishment.

Ironically, purportedly in support of her argument regarding the

rights of an abutting property owner, Arnold includes this quotation from 1OA McQuillin, the
Law of Municipal Corporations, §30:62 (3d ed. 1990):
"Private driveways used by the public are subject to municipal regulation, within
constitutional limits. However, an abutting property owner . . . has the right to
For example, i.e. in Arnold's letters to the City (AR 92 "While we do not agree that individual lot permits are
required for installation ofutility lines and roads for the subdivision ... "), in her building permit applications AR 69,
AR 77, 80, 83 ("construction of access roads") AR 93, 94 ("installation of utilities and roads in easement") , and on
the face of the Mountain View Subdivision plat itself, Arnold does not ever call her access a "driveway". Id.
Emphasis Added.
59 Ironically Arnold does too. It is only in a footnote that Arnold concedes this point that she too consistently
described her access as an "access road". It is only now, in litigation that she wishes to call her access road a
"driveway".
-,
In fact, this author notes that even in Appellant's Opening Brief, her description of the access changes
throughout the brief from an "access road" in the early pages and transitions to an "access driveway", and finally as
a "driveway".
58

- 25 -

construct a driveway from his or her property to the traveled portion of the
highway, provided, of course, the owner does not unreasonably interfere with the
public use of the street, and provided, further, the construction is not forbidden by
statute or ordinance."
This citation does not help Arnold. First, her access most certainly may interfere with the
public's use of the street. They might slide right off the edge of it. Arnold has placed great
amounts of fill of unknown composition not only on her own property but on the City's right of
way impacting erosion, run-off, snow removal, etc. As stated, it also creates potential
connectivity through Lots 5 and 6 to Highway 21. Second, this "graveled" access road on such a
steep slope is forbidden by ordinance for the reasons stated herein. Lastly, Arnold tries to
distinguish between a "right of way" and a "driveway" stating that a right of way is the "right to
pass through property owned by another ... " 60

Whether labelled an access road or private

driveway on a commercial lot is academic because of the commercial nature of the lot. Unless
Arnold restricts the use of the lot, this private driveway will be utilized by the public; i.e. the
customers of the potential myriad of permitted uses to this commercial lot.
Lastly, Arnold seeks to connect whatever this "graveled" thing is to the City's right of
way and as provided herein, a mere subdivision lot does not possess a vested right to connect to
an adjacent city right of way and certainly not without demonstrating that it will be performed
safely pursuant to the very much applicable SMC 16.36 and SMC 17.40.032.

Arnold believes

that Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968) ("Lomond")
supports the conclusion that unless a municipality has adopted an encroachment permit

60

Black's Law Dictionary 1440 (9th ed. 2009).
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ordinance any lot owner in a duly approved subdivision enjoys an unfettered right to access city
real property including its right of way; that a city is powerless to regulate access to its own
property. Arnold thus concludes stating the "approval of Building Permit 831 was a 'ministerial
duty' that the City was compelled to issue." Ben Lomond, Inc. says no such thing; a case easily
distinguishable from the present action. In that case, the City of Idaho Falls annexed land which
had been part of the county, but the City did not zone the property only later enacting a zoning
ordinance that, of course, cannot be applied to retroactively. Thus, the applicant was entitled to a
building permit to construct a service station, which included a second access. 61

Lomond merely reiterates Johnson, Continental Oil Co., and Village of Sandpoint v.
Doyle; that an ordinance generally should not restrict an abutting property owner right of access
unless the ordinance is justified by the city's police power. This Court noted in Lomond that
there were no reasonable grounds for denying the requested access. In fact the traffic expert
noted that an additional access would in fact add safety to the area by relieving congestion from
the adjoining shopping center. 62 In contrast, here there are valid "considerations for the health,
safety, moral or welfare of the City's inhabitants". 63 SMC 16.36 governs the construction of an
access road, driveway, or anything else on a slope exceeding ten percent. Arnold can cite to no
case that allows Arnold to perform an end-around this clearly applicable ordinance by proposing
the development on the hillside post-subdivision approval.

Id. See also Highlands; Cunningham v. City of Twin Falls, 125 Idaho 776, 874 P.2d 587 (Idaho App. 1994).
Lomond, 92 Idaho at 603, 448 P.2d at 217.
63 Jd.
61

62
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2.

Arnold's contention that a plat is not required to identify points of connectivity
from the internal subdivision to the outside adjacent public rights of way 1s
irrelevant but nonetheless incorrect.

Arnold argues that a "subdivision plat is not required to contain any and all points of
access to the public roads'' and more specifically that a plat does not need to show how inner
connector streets or individual lots (via a driveway) will access the public roadways.

First, as

expressed herein, Arnold bargained for and received preliminary plat approval wherein she
requested and received access through to Highway 21. Second, if Arnold thinks the Idaho Code
enables a developer to surreptitiously connect each and every lot abutting a public street to that
street as a matter of right, this is legally unsupportable and incongruous to modem subdivision
law.
SMC 6.16.030 requires a vicinity map to show the relationship of the proposed plat to the
surrounding areas as well as all right of ways, alleys, streets, etc. Additionally, the boundaries of
each lot as well as the exterior boundaries of the subdivision must be shown. 64 Arnold is being
deliberately obtuse to argue that one can realistically depict the external boundaries of each lot
and the subdivision in general as well as all easements, roads, alleys, and accesses without
depicting it in relationship to the neighboring properties and adjacent and/or abutting right-ofways. Meaningfully, the City contends this must include points of connectivity with the adjacent
properties. A plat application does not satisfy Title 50, Chapter 13 if the plat does not depict
where and how the roads, streets, access, alleys, and easements begin and terminate; i.e. a solid
line dead-end, curb, berm, fence, etc. or an open line stub street or connectivity to adjoining
64

See Idaho Code§§ 50-1304; 1313, 1330.

- 28 -

parcels or public roads.

While irrelevant, Arnold is being disingenuous to argue that a

developer, while required to depict how particular lots will access inner private road easements
within the subdivision, nonetheless possess a right appurtenant to the land to secretly access the
ci~y's right of way up a steep slope65 along the external boundaries of the subdivision without
depicting such plans on the plat merely by calling it a "driveway". Regardless, even if true and
Arnold is legally entitled to not include this on the subdivision plat, this only strengthens the
argument that Arnold must comply with the hillside ordinances, which are not directly tied to the
subdivision plat contents either.
3.

Arnold's contention that the access drive is not constructed on City property is
erroneous.

Arnold wishes to build an access road which admittedly includes modifying the City's
right of way placing great amounts of fill on a steep slope for an access to her commercial lot;
what Arnold now grossly mischaracterizes as a "slight overlay". There can be absolutely no
question that such work required Arnold to obtain a building permit. She failed to do so. It is
important to note that the City too is a property owner possessing the rights of a property owner
and the jurisdiction to control not only access but the construction activities over its right-of
way. 66 "Government power over public ways is 'exclusive and unlimited' ."67 Further, the City

along with concomitant required slope contour lines ... see SMC 16.16.030 K. "Contour lines"
Pursuant to Title 50, Chapter 13 a municipality's police power extends to the regulation of subdivisions and any
streets, driveways, alleys, or accesses whether private or public. As a matter of law, the power to "regulate" streets
is conferred on the municipality and the City has every right to regulate work performed on its own right-of-way.
McQuillen, §30.40." "In Idaho the streets from side to side and end to end belong to the public and are held by the
municipality in trust for the use of the public." In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 49, 44 P.3d 1100, 1104
(2002); Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501, 503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986) citing Keyser v. City of

65 •••
66
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possesses implied police powers to protect the public health and safety. In short, the City has a
vested interest in preventing Arnold from disrupting the efficacy of its right of way. 68
Before the District Court however, Arnold claimed that "[t]he access drive 1s not
constructed on City property"; that it is "fully contained within ... Lot 5".

Arnold's very own

letter dated March 31, 2014 pertaining to Building Permit 831 demonstrated the frivolity of her
argument:
"This building permit is no different than a previous permit #63 7 ... , which
allowed work on the city street to construct accesses on both Critchfield and
Ace of Diamonds. . ... [T]he Site Plan attached to 637 clearly showed the work
to be done on both the Arnold Property and the referenced city streets. . ..
There was no separate permit required for the work done on the City streets and
the Stanley Municipal Code (SMC) does not have a permitting process for
construction access onto city streets. 69
While we disagree with everything she said, the frivolity of her position is palpable. Now, before
this Court, she for the first time admits only to installing "a slight overlay". This too is a farce
as Arnold has placed vast amounts of fill on both her property but also on the City's right of way.
She dumped countless amounts of fill just to raise the level up this steep slope to meet Ace of
Diamonds. She clearly modified her lot and the City's right of way .as is plainly evident in the
agency record.

The pictures of the City's right of way, A.R. 52, specifically the fence line,

clearly shows the sheer volume of fill that Arnold placed on the City's right of way. The arrow
Boise, 30 Idaho 440, 165 P. 1121 (1917). A city has exclusive control by virtue of its police power over its streets,
highways and sidewalks within the municipal boundaries. Id; See also Tyrolean Associates v. City of Ketchum, 100
Idaho 703, 604 P.2d 717 (1979); City of Nampa v. Swayne, 97 Idaho 530, 547 P.2d 1135 (1976); Yellow Cab Taxi
Service v. City of Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d 681 (1948).
67 Merritt v. State, 742 P.2d 397, 113 Idaho 142 (1986) quoting Cf Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 211,
118 P.2d 721, 725 (1941).
68 Arnold has altered the crown/ edges of the road disrupting water run-off increasing the erosive effects on its right
of way.
69 AR 42 emphasis added.
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depicting the road level is several feet above the top of the fence. A.R. 55 shows the vegetation
(which prevents erosion) before Arnold modified the City's right of way and A.R. 54 shows the
pile of what used to be the City's vegetation; all illegally performed without a permit.

4.

Arnold's equal protection argument lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law.

Citing to various "class of one" cases, Arnold's equal protection argument is premised
entirely on her argument that the City treated her differently "than other similarly situated
property owners". Yet, she fails to allege any other property owners much less those that are
similarly situated. Rather, she compares herself to herself. Without citing to any authority, she
alleges unequal treatment based solely on "Arnolds' own prior dealings with the City ... " Her
argument in short is that she is intentionally being singled out and treated differently than ...
herself.
An equal protection claim cannot rest on disparate treatment than upon oneself. Rather,
the District Court noted that Arnold's accusations appear not to be that of equal protection but
that of estoppel: because the City did not enforce certain ordinances in the past against her, the
City is now estopped from doing so. 70 As a matter of law, the application of estoppel against a
municipality in the exercise of its police power is prohibited. 71 We agree with her in one regard:
of the many examples she proffered purportedly as evidence in support of her arguments, it only
highlights the fact that the City has allowed Arnold to get away with far, far, far more than she
was entitled. The mere fact that Arnold obtained preferential treatment or conversely that the

70

R. Vol. l, p. 130 citing Kleiber v. City ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501,503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).

11

Id.
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City neglected to properly enforce its ordinances in the past does not legally preclude the City
from forever after enforcing its ordinances. The same is true for the equal protection claim.
Akin to prosecutorial discretion such a "selective enforcement" class of one claim is without
authority of iaw. 72
In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory application of the laws such that
equal protection standards are violated, [a plaintiff] ... must first establish the existence
of a "deliberate plan of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification such as
race, sex, religion, etc. Selective enforcement without more, does not comprise a
constitutional violation under either the Idaho or United States Constitutions. 73
This equal protection claim is legally without merit and any amorphous references to past
incidents are irrelevant and outside of the Administrative Record.
Most importantly, even if true, the City's treatment of Arnold fulfills a rational basis test
insofar as this particular building permit application is unlike any preceding it as it raises public
safety concerns unlike any before given the severity of the slope of the proposed access. Arnold
asserts that she "had gone through the approval and renewal process regarding the construction
of driveways for their property nine different times prior to filing an application for Building
Permit 831 (see building permits 637, 690, and 789, each renewed twice)." She then claims that
the "facts were essentially identical to Building Permit 831 ... " This is not true; not even close.
In fact, this is the single most important fact.

First, she never referenced the construction of a

"driveway"; a minor point but irritating. Second, she seems not to acknowledge that the City
approved her requests nine times in a row when her permits depicted constructing access roads
72 Akin to the argument that because the police officer let the prior person go without citing them for speeding, the
officer should (must) let the defendant go too. The fact of selective enforcement, without more, is not per se
arbitrary. Young Elec. Sign Co. v. State ex rel. Winder, 135 Idaho 804,809, 25 P.3d 117, 122 (2001).
73 Coeur D'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,845, 136 P.3d 310,316 (2006)(intemal quotes and citations omitted).
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on relatively flat terrain. (See contour lines in A.R. 56) Third, and most importantly as stated
throughout Respondent's Brief, it is here for the first time in Building Permit 831 that she stated
that she wanted to traverse straight down this steep slope. 74 75

E.

Arnold has failed to demonstrate that the City prejudiced her substantial rights or
that she has suffered any harm.
1.

Arnold's purported Vested Right Appurtenant to the Land.

The party contesting a city council's decision must demonstrate that 1) the board erred in
a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3); and 2) that the board's action prejudiced
its substantial rights. 76 Absent either of these two conditions, the district court must affirm the

Building Permit #637 deserves a comment. It is irrelevant. First, it predates the Mountain View Subdivision
pertaining to the entire un-platted parcel. As it predated the Mountain View Subdivision, it is completely irrelevant
and supplanted by the duly approved preliminary plat. However, Arnold raises the issue to support her claim that
because a prior city council ignored its ordinances then by not requiring engineered plans, etc., the current city
council is legally estopped from enforcing its ordinances now. For the reasons stated herein, this argument fails to
state a legally supportable equal protection claim.
However, there is one other distinguishing characteristic associated with this building permit. On the map,
A.R. 45, it is interesting to note that Arnold drew a hard left tum coming off of Ace of Diamonds in order to not dip
into the steep ravine. (Note the contour lines, A.R. 56) Thus she was parallel to the steep slope staying above it.
Similarly, the access coming off Critchfield Avenue regarding Lot 1 is nearly flat. Arnold drafted her preliminary
plat. It was a mistake to not depict an access from Critchfield into Lot I. However, Lot 1 is otherwise landlocked
so the City issued the building permit on this flat terrain. Again and again, Arnold stressed that the hillside
ordinances did not apply because she was not developing on a slope exceeding ten percent. A.R. 92. This certainly
does not excuse Arnold or the City as the City clearly should not have approved these building permits as the
hillside was developed. See again the estoppel arguments herein. Nonetheless, it does however demonstrate that
even here these building permits are distinguishable from Building Permit 831 where Arnold proposed to develop an
access road perpendicular to the steepest parts of the ravine.
74

75 With regard to building permit 789, the City objects to Arnold's argument on page 7 of its brief that building
permit #789 ever depicted or granted Arnold the right to render improvements to the north side of Ace of Diamonds
street. There is no evidence whatsoever to support this contention. It certainly is not depicted on any map or any
text on any permit prior to building permit #831. Arnold conveniently cites to A.R. 42; a letter written by her
pertaining to building permit 831 after the city denied the permit. It is a fiction. As soon as Arnold began to disturb
Ace of Diamonds street, the City objected even sending the Sherriffto intervene.
76 I.C. § 67-5279(4); Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131.
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board's action77 . "There is a strong presumption that the actions of the [local governmental
entity], where it has interpreted and applied its own ... ordinances, are valid." 78
For the reasons stated herein, Arnold bargained for and obtained approval of the plat for
the Mountain View Subdivision which granted Lot 5 direct access from Highway 21 on its northwest side via an access road depicted along the western edge of Lot 6. 79 Although Arnold clearly
would like two accesses and subjectively believes she has this right, she has not plead any
actualized harm by not being granted two accesses to her property.

Her claim of right

appurtenant to the land is illusory and her purported injury is self-induced. 80 Arnold provided no
evidence how this access; i.e. complying with her own plat, constituted a hardship or is otherwise
unworkable nor has she sought to amend her plat. Now, Arnold's application seeks a secondary
access from Ace of Diamonds Street, which is not depicted on the approved Mountain View Plat.
More importantly, her application·is bereft of any technical information to ensure the protection

Taylor, 147 Idaho at 431, 210 P.3d at 539.
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003)
79 AR. P. 65.
80 See R. Vol. 1, p. 135 wherein the District Court noted:
77
78

The Court understands that the Arnolds have already constructed most the access road and will
lose all of the investment put into building the road and may have to brunt the cost of tearing at
least a part of it down if the road is not ultimately approved as is. This, however, is not a
consideration for the Court because the road was constructed in violation of Stanley city
ordinances. As it is, the Arnolds will likely suffer a substantial financial setback because of the
City Council's decision to deny the permit. However, that setback would have been minimal if
the Arnolds had followed the correct procedure and obtained permission to build the access road
before beginning construction. Had the Arnolds followed the established procedure before
beginning construction, their setback would be limited to the added costs of requesting a plat
amendment and providing the specifications requested by the City Council.
The City simply does not know what material was utilized to build this access road. As a matter of public safety
notably given Stanley's weather, the hillside ordinances are to protect any who use this access road from harm.
Ignoring the City's cease and desist communications, Arnold's actual harm is of her own making.
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of the public health and safety. Her building permit application was denied and she is in the
same position as she was upon the approval of her subdivision. She still has an approved access
to her lot.

2.

Arnold has failed to demonstrate prejudice by virtue of a purported lack of a
transcribable record 81 •

A transcribable record is not required at all, but regardless Arnold is not deprived of due
process by virtue of an absent minute. Because the Mayor's comments begin mid-sentence,
Arnold insinuates she has been deprived of a procedural due process right to which she is entitled
and that she is simply in the dark as to the City's rationale or that this Court is incapable of
discerning the basis of the City Council's denial of the building permit application. This strains
credibility and Arnold can make no claim that she is denied due process. Arnold received the
benefit of a well-reasoned decision. After comprehensively addressing the applicable case law in
this arena, 82 the District Court stated:
In the current case, there is a clear audio recording of the City Council's decision
to deny the building permit application; however, the recording is missing the first

Although academic as a transcribable record was provided, there still is the threshold issue whether a transcribable
record was required for the issuance or denial of a building permit pursuant to the plain text of the Local Land Use
Planning Act ("LLUPA"). See the plain text of Idaho Code §67-6536 which requires a transcribable verbatim
record only where an appeal is provided under LLUPA. Does a building permit require a public hearing in" which
testimony or evidence is received or at which an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing
board regarding a pending application"? Must a building permit be issued in a public meeting by the city council
wherein "the commission or governing board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record"? An
appeal of a denial of a building permit is not authorized pursuant to LLUPA other than for a narrow class of building
permits "for development on any lands designated upon the future acquisitions map." Reading the statute as a
whole, the City cannot see how a transcribable record is required.
82 Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Kootenai County, 133 Idaho 833, 843-844, 993 P.2d 596, 606-607 (1999);
Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118, 867 P.2d 989, 992 (1994); Gay v. County
Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 629, 651 P.2d 560, 563 (Ct.App.1982); Cooper v. Ada County, 101
Idaho 407, 411, 614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980).
81
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minute or two of the decision. The Court has listened to the audio recording of
the decision and heard the City Council discussing a variety of reasons why the
building permit must be denied, any one of which provides a sufficient basis on
which to deny the building permit application. If the omitted portion83 of the
recording contained some evidence that the City Council acted arbitrarily, that
evidence is contradicted by the remainder of the discussion on the recording.
Appiy the Rural Kootenai_ standard to the City Council's audio recording, it is
clear that the recording is "adequate for purposes of ascertaining the basis of the
[Council's] decision" to deny the building permit application. This Court finds
that the appropriate due process safeguards are satisfied with this recording. 84
Given Arnold's considerable written testimony and the plethora of evidence in the record85 ,
Arnold has failed to demonstrate how she has been deprived of procedural due process by virtue
of the inaudible one minute of the audio disc.

v.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
For the reasons stated herein, Arnold lacked a reasonable basis in fact or law to appeal
the City's denial of its building permit application pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and I.A.R.
40 and 41. Pointedly, there is nothing for this Court to review. Arnold is not eligible for a
building permit. In support of her building permit application seeking to develop an access road
on a slope exceeding ten percent, she failed to provide a scintilla of information that would

The City notes that the inaudible portion of the disc amounts to 1 minute, 11 seconds out of the 56 minute
meeting. The comprehensive meeting minutes of the February 13, 2014 hearing reflect that the meeting began at
approximately 6:03 p.m. and concluded at approximately 7:42 p.m. This approximate time total is 99:00 minutes.
The minutes also reflect that a recess for executive session began at approximately 6:45 p.m. and resumed upon
conclusion of the executive session at approximately 7:26 p.m. This time total is approximately 41 :00 minutes.
When one subtracts the time period for the executive session not contained on the audio from the length of the entire
hearing as approximated in the minutes, the remaining portion of the February 13, 2014 hearing is roughly 58:00
minutes. The first audio disc is 42:49 minutes long and the second is 14:00 minutes long, for a total of 56:49
minutes. The second disc of the audio, which part was included in the transcript, begins recording mid-sentence.
84 R. Vol. 1, p. 131.
85 IN particular the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law clearly reference the Stanley Municipal Code's hillside
provisions. See A.R. 34, 36.
83
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enable the City to evaluate and render educated findings that the proposed access road was
constructed safely utilizing sound engineering practices.

While Arnold believes it is sufficient

to merely state that "gravel" will be used, the City acting within its police powers finds this
unacceptable. Perhaps if she had provided something and the City arbitrarily der..ied her expert's
good faith prima facie offering of sound engineering, she might have a basis to object. She
offered nothing.

She has not amended her plat nor indicated that her approved access is

unsatisfactory. More importantly, she was granted the only access that she specifically asked for
in her plat.

Rather, Arnold merely proffered conclusory legal maxims that the City was

compulsorily obligated to grant a second access because her lot in a duly approved subdivision
abutted a city street. However, Arnold has not offered a single case to support her conclusion
that she has successfully evaded the City's hillside ordinances by waiting to the building permit
stage to seek to develop the hillside.

The City's hillside ordinances clearly apply to the

construction of an access road on a slope exceeding ten percent.
Unfortunately, the City is accustomed to Arnold's litigious nature. In Arnold v. City of
Stanley, 345 P.3d 1008, 158 Idaho 218 (2015), this Court was unpersuaded by her arguments that
she had a reasonable basis in fact or law:
"[t]he purpose of I. C. § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary
action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens defending against groundless charges." In Castrigno v.
McQuade, this Court awarded attorney fees to Ada County when an appellant
appealed without a reasonable basis in fact or law. There we reasoned, in part,
that attorney fees were appropriate because the appellants, in arguing to the Court,
had added nothing to the argument that failed in the district court. Id. We noted
that appellants had the benefit of the district court's well-reasoned, articulate
analysis finding against their position, yet they still chose to expend more time
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and resources to bring an appeal, using the same arguments that were
unpersuasive below and remained unpersuasive on appeal. Id. . ... Although the
Arnolds had the benefit of the district court's articulate and well-reasoned analysis
to that effect, they still chose to bring an appeal, further raising the expense to the
City to defend against the same argurnents. 86
Arnold was afforded a well-reasoned decision by the District Court; two actually considering the
Decision and Order Re: Motion for Rehearing.

Here, for the third time, Arnold is again

rehashing the very same legal arguments that were unpersuasive below and remain unpersuasive
on appeal. Yet, the City has again borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden against
groundless charges. This access road needs to be constructed safely.
VI.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the City requests that this Court affirm the decision of the
District Court and pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 award the City its reasonable costs and
attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter.
Dated this

86

gth

day of August, 2016.

Arnoldv. City ofStanley, 345 P.3d 1008, 1014, 158 Idaho 218,226 (2015) Emphasis added.
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; On page 9, f.n. 3 of its Opening Brief, Arnold argues that the building permit portion of the Stanley Municipal
Code was adopted after Building Permit #831 was approved and arguing it is therefore inapplicable. This is not true
and quite aggravating. In this action, the City has been citing to the previous versions of SMC 15.04.010 and .020
pursuant to Ordinance 184 which predates Building Permit 831. Pursuant to the Ordinance 192, there is additional
underlined text that was added to the ordinance; none of which pertains to this action. In short all of the provisions
cited herein were not modified at all and predate Building Permit #831:
15.04.010: REQUIRED: No building shall be constructed, erected, or altered structurally, nor shall any lot
be excavated for sidewalks, sewer, water, septic tanks, roads, or any other purpose, nor shall fill be placed
on any lot, nor shall any lot be cleared, or fenced unless a building permit therefore has been issued by the
city council or its authorized representative. Structural alterations subject to permitting shall include any
changes to the building footprint, or changes to the exterior appearance of the structure that are subject to
the building appearance and materials requirements covered in Title 17 of the Stanley municipal code.
Actions exempt from the building permit process include gardening and raised garden boxes, ground-level
patios, maintenance and repair on existing roads and driveways, movable storage sheds less than 150
square feet that comply with zoning and building appearance regulations, fence replacement or
maintenance if construction is substantially the same as the current fence and otherwise meets requirements
of the Stanley Municipal Code, landscaping that does not substantially alter the terrain, sprinkler systems,
and playground equipment that is moveable and not permanently anchored. The issuance of a building
permit by the city does not imply or guarantee the safety, suitability, or structural adequacy of buildings,
building pads, retaining walls, fill, or natural terrain for meeting structural support requirements for
buildings. Permittee shall follow good engineering and architectural practices relating to the construction of
new commercial and public buildings, and fill compaction for structural support and for preventing collapse
and/or erosion of fill not used for structural support. Provided, however, no building permit shall be
necessary for repairs to previously installed utility lines such as telephone, sewer, or water; said repairs
shall be limited to restoration of the line to proper working condition and shall not include any expansion or
extension of said lines. All permits shall issue only in conformity herewith and shall be valid only for a
period of one year thereafter. Changes to the proposed use or construction specified in the original
approved permit that occur during the term of the permit shall require approval by the City of Stanley. Prior
to initiating such changes, the applicant may be required by the City Council to submit an amended
application for review and approval. Building permit fee costs shall be established by city council
resolution.
15.04.020: APPLICATION: Applications for building permits shall be submitted in the form specified by
resolution of the city council and shall be accompanied by the application fee, a drawing showing the
location of the proposed project on the applicant's property and the location of the property in the city,
building plans and specifications, and proof of approval of the proposed project by the appropriate fire
department and the appropriate sewer district or state health department. Applications which do not contain
all of the foregoing shall not be considered complete. Development and construction drawings and
technical support material shall be to scale or otherwise in sufficient detail to allow a technical or
engineering review to determine the project's effects and impacts on adjacent properties and whether the
proposed development complies with all zoning requirements. Applicant is responsible for obtaining
required permits and approvals from all Federal, State and local agencies and departments with jurisdiction
covering the proposed building permit actions.
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